Is self-awareness necessary to have a theory of mind?

Author: Tony Calmette1,2, Hélène Meunier1,2
Affiliation: <sup>1</sup> Centre de Primatologie de l&#x27;Université de Strasbourg, Niederhausbergen, 67207, France. <sup>2</sup> Laboratoire de Neurosciences Cognitives et Adaptatives, UMR 7364, CNRS, Université de Strasbourg, Strasbourg, 67000, France.
Conference/Journal: Biol Rev Camb Philos Soc
Date published: 2024 Apr 27
Other: Special Notes: doi: 10.1111/brv.13090. , Word Count: 85

Forty years ago, Gallup proposed that theory of mind presupposes self-awareness. Following Humphrey, his hypothesis was that individuals can infer the mental states of others thanks to the ability to monitor their own mental states in similar circumstances. Since then, advances in several disciplines, such as comparative and developmental psychology, have provided empirical evidence to test Gallup's hypothesis. Herein, we review and discuss this evidence.

Keywords: agency; body ownership; folk psychology; introspection; mentalising; metacognition; mindreading; self‐awareness; self‐recognition; theory of mind.

PMID: 38676546 DOI: 10.1111/brv.13090